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Abstract
We consider the problem of assessing value of demand sharing in a multi-stage supply chain
in which the retailer observes stationary autoregressive moving average demand with Gaussian
white noise (shocks). Similar to previous research, we assume each supply chain player constructs
its best linear forecast of the leadtime demand and uses it to determine the order quantity via
a periodic review myopic order-up-to policy. We demonstrate how a typical supply chain player
can determine the extent of its available information under demand sharing by studying the
properties of the moving average polynomials of adjacent supply chain players. Hence, we
study how a player can determine its available information under demand sharing, and use this
information to forecast leadtime demand. We characterize the value of demand sharing for a
typical supply chain player. Furthermore, we show conditions under which (i) it is equivalent
to no sharing, (ii) it is equivalent to full information shock sharing, and (iii) it is intermediate
in value to the two previously described arrangements. We then show that demand propagates
through a supply chain where any player may share nothing, its demand, or its full-information
shocks with an adjacent upstream player as quasi-ARMA in - quasi-ARMA out. We also provide
a convenient form for the propagation of demand in a supply chain that will lend itself to future
research applications.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of assessing value of demand sharing in a multi-stage supply chain in which
the retailer observes covariance-stationary autoregressive moving average demand with Gaussian
white noise (shocks). We assume that all supply chain players use a myopic order-up- to inventory
policy where negative order quantities are allowed, but the probability of negative demand or
negative orders is negligible. It is assumed that the lead time guarantee holds, i.e., if an upstream
player does not have enough stock to fill an order from the adjacent downstream player, then the
upstream player will meet the shortfall from an alternative source, with additional cost representing
the penalty cost to this shortfall. Excess demand at the retailer is backlogged. Similar to previous
research, we assume each supply chain player constructs its best linear forecast of the leadtime
demand and uses it to determine the order quantity via a periodic review myopic order-up-to
policy.
With respect to the information structure, we assume, as others have (c.f. [Lee et al., 2000]
(hereafter LST) that the form and parameters of the model generating a downstream player’s
demand are known to the adjacent upstream player. However the downstream player’s demand
realizations, and shocks that generate all of the player’s information (the downstream player’s
full information shocks), may be private knowledge. When there is no information sharing, the
upstream player receives only an order from the adjacent downstream player. When there is
demand sharing, the downstream player provides its demand in addition to placing its order with
the upstream player. Finally, when there is full information shock sharing, the downstream player
provides its full information shocks in addition to placing its order with the upstream player.
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The existing literature either does not distinguish between demand sharing and shock sharing
[Gaur et al., 2005] (hereafter GGS) and [Zhang, 2004] (hereafter Zhang)) or focuses on the value of
full information shock sharing in a supply chain without allowing for the possibility that a player
may share its demand as opposed to its full information shocks [Giloni et al., 2012] (hereafter
GHS). We demonstrate how a typical supply chain player can determine the extent of its available
information under demand sharing by studying the properties of the moving average polynomials of
adjacent supply chain players. We utilize the methods and results described in GHS (2012) where
they demonstrate how a typical supply chain player can determine its available information under
full information shock sharing or possibly under no sharing arrangement. We study how a player
can determine its available information under demand sharing, and use this information to forecast
leadtime demand. Furthermore, we show conditions under which (i) it is equivalent to no sharing,
(ii) it is equivalent to full information shock sharing, and (iii) it is intermediate in value to the two
previously described arrangements.
After characterizing a player’s information set under demand sharing, we then study how de-
mand propagates through a supply chain where any player may share nothing, its demand, or
its full-information shocks with an adjacent upstream player. Specifically, we find that demand
propagates as quasi-ARMA (QUARMA) in - quasi-ARMA out even with the possibility of demand
sharing. We also introduce a convenient mathematical structure for the propagation of demand,
notappearing in previous literature. This is done by studying QUARMA propagation as sums of
polynomials rather than linear combinations of coefficients. This form provides more intuition be-
hind how demand propagates upstream in the supply chain. Furthermore, it allows for the study of
various supply chain dynamics, such as the bullwhip effect and the asymptotic behavior of supply
chains with many stages.
We provide several important contributions to the literature. The first is in characterizing a
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player’s information set when the adjacent downstream player shares demand. The second is in
establishing the new result that demand sharing can be intermediate in value. We provide examples
of this by demonstrating what a player’s full information shocks and mean square forecast error
(MSFE) would be under the three aforementioned sharing arrangements. The third is that we show
that under the possibility of either no sharing, demand sharing, or full information shock sharing,
demand propagates upstream the supply chain as quasi-ARMA in - quasi-ARMA out. The fourth
is that we provide a convenient form for the propagation of demand in a supply chain that will lend
itself to future research applications.
2 The Research Problem
2.1 Recovering Shocks from Historical Data
In this paper we represent a player’s information in terms of a white noise series. It is therefore
essential to understand if and when a series of shocks can be recovered from present and past
observations. It is sometimes assumed (incorrectly) that this is always possible. The following
example illustrates this problem for a simple moving average (MA) model.
Example 1. Part I
Consider the following MA(1) model:
Dt = c+ t − θ1t−1 (1)
Consider trying to solve for t in terms of present and past values of {Dt}. Note that (1) can
be rewritten as
t = Dt − c+ θ1t−1
or
t = Dt − c+ θ1(Dt−1 − c+ θ1t−2).
Continuing in the same manner we have for any N > 0
t = c
N−1∑
n=0
θn1 +
N−1∑
n=0
θn1Dt−n + θ
N
1 t−N (2)
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If |θ1|< 1 then the last term in (2) will approach 0 and we get the representation:
t = c
∞∑
n=0
θn1 +
∞∑
n=0
θn1Dt−n
which shows that t can be written as a convergent series of present and past observations {Dt}.
Any {Dt} that satisfies this property is said to be invertible with respect to shocks {t}. Note that
|θ1|< 1 if and only if the root of 1− θ1z is outside the unit circle. As we will discuss in Remark 1,
the location of roots is central to a discussion of invertibility.
However, if |θ1|> 1, we will show in Example 1 Part II that one cannot express the current
shock as a convergent series of present and past observations. The case of |θ1|> 1 occurs if and
only if the root of 1 − θ1z is inside the unit circle. Here the demand series {Dt} is said to be
non-invertible with respect to shocks {t}.
If |θ1|= 1, then it is possible to recover t from present and past values of {Dt}, however this is
accomplished in a different way than described for the case when |θ1|< 1. We still say that {Dt} is
invertible with respect to shocks {t} for this case. Refer to GHS for a discussion of invertibility.
The invertibility concepts described in this example extend naturally for an MA(q) model.
Similarly, for an AR(p) model, we say that demand series {Dt} is causal with respect to shocks
{t} if we can write Dt as a linear combination of present and past {t}.
Remark 1. A series {Dt} is causal and invertible ARMA(p,q) with respect to a series of indepen-
dent Gaussian random variables {t}, called “shocks”, having mean zero and variance σ2 if it can
be written as
Dt = c+ φ1Dt−1 + φ2Dt−2 + ...+ φpDt−p + t − θ1t−1 − θ2t−2 − ...− θqt−q, (3)
where c is a constant and the roots of the polynomials 1− φ1z − ...− φpzp and 1− θ1z − ...− θqzq
are outside the unit circle for z ∈ C.
It is often useful to express (3) in terms of the backshift operator, B, where Bst = t−s
and BrDt = Dt−r. In order to do so, let φ(B) = 1 − φ1B − φ2B2 − ... − φpBp and θ(B) =
1− θ1B − θ2B2 − ...− θqBq. Then {Dt} in (3) can be expressed as
φ(B)Dt = c+ θ(B)t (4)
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For some more intuition behind invertibility and the use of the backshift operator, consider the
following:
Example 1. Part II
We can rewrite the model (1) in terms of the backshift operator as
Dt = c+ (1− θ1B)t (5)
which can be rewritten as
t = − 1
1− θ1Bc+
1
1− θ1BDt (6)
Suppose |θ1|< 1. Through a formal Taylor series expansion of 1
1− θ1B , this can be rewritten as
t = −
∞∑
n=0
(θ1B)
nc+
∞∑
n=0
(θ1B)
nDt
or equivalently
t = −
∞∑
n=0
(θ1B)
nc+
∞∑
n=0
θn1Dt−n
and hence we can write t as a linear combination of present and past values {Dn}tn=−∞. Thus
here the model in (5) is invertible.
Suppose now that |θ1|> 1 and consider the term 1
1− θ1B in (6). Doing some manipulations we
have that
1
1− θ1B =
1/B
B−1 − θ1 =
1/B
θ1(θ
−1
1 B
−1 − 1) = (−θ
−1
1 /B)
1
1− θ−11 B−1
Since |θ1|> 1, it is obvious that | 1
θ1
|> 1 and through a formal Taylor series expansion of 1
1− θ−11 B−1
,
we rewrite (6) as
t = (θ
−1
1 /B)
∞∑
n=0
(θ−11 B
−1)nc+ (−θ−11 /B)
∞∑
n=0
(θ−11 B
−1)nDt
which can be rewritten as
t = (θ
−1
1 /B)
0∑
n=−∞
(θ1B)
nc+ (−θ−11 /B)
0∑
n=−∞
(θ1B)
nDt
or equivalently
t = (θ
−1
1 /B)
0∑
n=−∞
(θ1B)
nc+ (−θ−11 /B)
∞∑
n=0
θ−n1 Dt+n
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Here t is expressed through values in the sequence {Dn}∞n=t+1, which are in fact unknown in
practice at time t. Thus the model in (5) is not invertible if |θ1|< 1.
From this example, we get the intuition behind Remark 1. We can see this by rewriting (4) as
t = −θ−1(B)c+ φ(B)θ−1(B)Dt
The polynomial θ(z) = 1− θ1z − ...− θqzq, having roots z1, ..., zq, can be factorized as
q∏
j=1
(1− z
zj
).
Therefore the previous equation is equivalent to
t = −θ−1(B)c+ φ(B)q∏
j=1
(1− z−1j B)
Dt (7)
We can treat the terms
1
1− z−1j B
in the same way we treated
1
1− θ1B in Example 1 Part II.
In doing so, when we express t through observations {Dt}, we will require some values in the
sequence {Dn}∞n=t+1 if and only if there is a root zj such that |zj |< 1.
In accordance with GHS, we say that {Dt} is QUARMA(p, q, J) with respect to shocks {t} if
it can be written as
Dt = c+ φ1Dt−1 + φ2Dt−2 + ...+ φpDt−p + t−J − θ1t−J−1 − θ2t−J−2 − ...− θqt−J−q (8)
or, in terms of the backshift operator,
φ(B)Dt = c+B
Jθ(B)t (9)
where φ(B) and θ(B) are as previously defined. We refer to φ(z) and θ(z) as the AR and MA
polynomials in the QUARMA representation of {Dt} with respect to {t}. We refer to J as the
QUARMA degree. Note that {Dt} which is QUARMA with respect to {t} is ARMA with respect
to {BJt}. As in GHS, if J > 0 in (9), then {Dt} is non-invertible with respect to {t} since, at time
t, there would be no way to recover t from present and past values {Dn}tn=−∞. The model in (9)
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will be central to our study of demand propagation as we will show that demand {Dk,t} of player
k may be QUARMA, with a QUARMA degree Jk > 0, even though the retailer observes ARMA
demand. Henceforth {Dk,t} and {k,t} will refer to player k’s demand series and full information
shock (FIS) series, defined below in Definition 1. Dk,t and k,t will refer to player k’s demand and
shock at time t.
2.2 Assumptions
We consider a K-stage supply chain where at discrete equally-spaced time periods, the retailer
(assumed to be at stage 1) faces external demand {D1,t}, for a single item. Let {D1,t} follow a
covariance stationary ARMA (p, q1) process with p ≥ 0, q1 ≥ 0:
φ(B)D1,t = d+ θ1(B)1,t (10)
where d > 0 is a constant and the roots of φ(z) and θ1(z) are outside the unit circle to insure that the
retailer’s demand is causal and invertible with respect to {1,t}. Following LST, Zhang and GHS,
we assume that the shocks {1,t} are Gaussian white noise. Let the replenishment leadtime from the
retailer’s supplier to the retailer be `1 periods. Excess demand at the retailer is backlogged. Let the
replenishment leadtime from the player at stage k+ 1 to stage k be `k periods. We assume that all
supply chain players use a myopic order-up-to inventory policy where negative order quantities are
allowed, but d is sufficiently large so that the probability of negative demand or negative orders is
negligible. Furthermore, hk and pk are player k’s unit holding and shortage (or backorder) costs per
time period. Player k’s required service level is given by ck = Φ
−1[ pkpk+hk ], where Φ is the standard
Normal cdf. It is assumed that for k ≥ 1 the `k period lead time guarantee holds, i.e., if the player
at stage k+1 does not have enough stock to fill an order from the player at stage k, then the player
at stage k + 1 will meet the shortfall from an alternative source, with additional cost representing
the penalty cost to this shortfall. [Gallego and Zipkin, 1999] show how this assumption allows one
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to decompose a multi-stage system with no alternative source into single-stage systems and to
approximate the cost of the system.
Hence, at the end of time period t, after demand D1,t has been observed, the retailer observes
the inventory position and places order D2,t with its supplier. The retailer receives the shipment of
this order at the beginning of period t+ `1 + 1, where `1 ≥ 0. The sequence of events at all supply
chain players is similar. However, it is further assumed that all upstream supply chain players
observe their demand, observe their inventory positions and place their orders instantaneously at
the end of time period t.
We assume that all players place their orders based on the best linear forecast of their lead-time
demand. This means that player k’s order will be based on its best linear forecast of the demand it
will observe through time period t+ `k + 1 (that is
∑`k+1
i=1 Dk,t+i). It is assumed that all upstream
supply chain players observe their demand, observe their inventory positions and place their orders
instantaneously at the end of every time period t.
We assume that, at time t, along with placing its order, a player may choose to share nothing,
its demand Dk,t, or its FIS k,t, with an adjacent upstream player. It is assumed that all players are
aware of the retailer’s model and all sharing arrangements that occur downstream. We will show
that this assumption guarantees that all players know the model for their own demand {Dk,t} with
respect to their FIS {k,t}. The last assumption also guarantees the information structure assumed
by GHS (2012), GGS (2005), LST (2000), Raghunathan (2001), and Zhang (2004), namely that,
for k ≥ 2 the form and parameters of the model generating player k − 1’s demand are known to
player k. However player k − 1’s demand realizations and/or full information shocks may not be
observable by player k.
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2.3 Information Sets and Full Information Shocks
As mentioned above, each player will forecast lead-time demand based on their information set
at time t. As in GHS, we denote the full information set available to player k as Mkt . Let
MDkt = sp{1, Dk,t, Dk,t−1, Dk,t−2, . . .}, where “sp{}” refers to the “closed linear span”. Then
MDkt is the Hilbert space generated by {1, Dk,t, Dk,t−1, Dk,t−2, . . .} with inner product given by
the covariance. We will at times refer to MDkt as the “linear past” of {Dk,t}. Similarly let Mkt =
sp{1, k,t, k,t−1, k,t−2, . . .}. For the linear past of two time series, for example, {Dk−1,t} and {Dk,t},
we write MDk−1,Dkt = sp{1, Dk−1,t, Dk,t, Dk−1,t−1, Dk,t−1, . . .}.
As an example on how to determine a player’s information set, consider the retailer’s information
setM1t . Since at any time period t the retailer knows the series {D1,t}, the retailer can also compute
any linear combination of {1, D1,t, D1,t−1, D1,t−2, . . .}. Since the retailer only observes D1,t, we say
thatM1t =MD1t . However, if we recall our assumption that the retailer’s demand is invertible and
causal with respect to the shocks {1,t}, we find that the retailer can recover the series {1,t} from the
series {D1,t} and vice-versa (see [Brockwell and Davis, 1991], pp 83-88 for a complete discussion of
invertibility and causality). Therefore we can say thatMD1t =M1t . Thus the retailer’s information
set is also M1t =M1t . In the presence of information sharing, there are several possible forms for
player k’s information set Mkt .
Now that we have defined player k’s information set, we can define player k’s full information
shocks as they appear in GHS (2012).
Definition 1. Suppose for k > 0 we can represent player k’s demand series {Dk,t} as a QUARMA
with respect to a series of shocks {k,t}. We say that {k,t} are player k’s Full Information Shocks
(FIS) if Mkt =Mkt .
This definition implies two key properties of full information shocks. Player k’s information set
can be used to characterize player k’s full information shocks. Also, player k’s information set can
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be characterized using player k’s full information shocks.
We now introduce an example that we will study throughout the paper. This example will
show how information is gained from various sharing arrangements. Furthermore this example
demonstrates the importance of studying various sharing arrangements because the difference in
value of the arrangements can be significant even for the very simple model provided below.
Example 2. Part I
Suppose the retailer observes ARMA(2,2) demand given by
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D1,t = d+ (1− 83
57
B +
289
456
B2)1,t (11)
We will assume that `1 = 1 and `2 = 1.
Note that φ(z) = 1 + 13z +
1
2z
2 has roots −0.333333 + 1.374369i and −0.333333 − 1.374369i
which are outside the unit circle and θ1(z) = 1 − 8357z + 289456z2 has roots 1.148789 + 0.508074i and
1.148789−0.508074i which are also outside the unit circle. Therefore the retailer’s demand is causal
and invertible with respect to 1,t.
Suppose the retailer shares its shocks with the supplier. Following the propagation described
in GHS (under shock-sharing), with `1 = 1, we find that the supplier observes the following
ARMA(2,2) demand:
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D2,t = d+ (1− 32
3
B +
20
3
B2)2,t
where 2,t = (−9/152)1,t. We denote the innovation variance of {2,t} by σ22.
We stop the discussion of this example here for now and will continue it later in Section 3 once
we derive the necessary tools to study it further.
2.4 Demand Propagation from Stage k − 1 to k
GHS show that when players can either share nothing or their full information shocks, ARMA
demand at the retailer given in equation (10) propagates up the supply chain such that player k
(with k > 1) faces QUARMA(p, qk, Jk) demand with respect to its full information shocks, {k,t},
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i.e.,
Dk,t = d+φ1Dk,t−1+φ2Dk,t−2+· · ·+φpDk,t−p+k,t−Jk−θk,1k,t−Jk−1−θk,2k,t−Jk−2−· · ·−θk,qkk,t−Jk−qk .
(12)
where θk,qk 6= 0. Note that in equation (12) the most recent Jk shocks do not appear. As long as
Jk < ∞, the QUARMA(p, qk, Jk) model for player k’s demand with respect to shocks {k,t} may
be expressed using the backshift operator B as,
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
Jkθk(B)k,t, (13)
where θk(B) = 1−
∑qk
j=1 θk,jB
j .
A key contribution of this paper is showing that an equation of the form (13) holds when
demand sharing is also allowed throughout the chain. We prove this by mathematical induction on
k in Theorem 3 of Section 5. The inductive hypothesis in the proof is that for a particular k > 1
we can express player k − 1’s demand {Dk−1,t} in terms of {k−1,t} as
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θk−1(B)k−1,t (14)
Sections 3-4 use (14) to obtain general formulas for player k’s full information shocks {k,t}. The-
orem 3 makes use of the results found in these sections to show that (13) indeed holds even when
players can share their demand.
In Section 3 we will discuss how player k−1 will forecast its demand and place its order to player
k according to a myopic order-up-to-policy sharing either nothing, Dk−1,t, or k−1,t. Section 3 will
discuss how player k receives the order, which we show is QUARMA with respect to player k− 1’s
full information shocks. Note that when describing player k−1’s order it is unnecessary to consider
the sharing arrangement between player k − 1 and player k. Section 4 will discuss how player k
will recover its full information shocks {k,t} based on its information set, which may depend on
its sharing arrangement with player k − 1. These shocks determine the QUARMA representation
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of player k’s demand {Dk,t} with respect to {k,t}. At this stage we have come back to equation
(14) with k replacing k − 1 and demand propagation will continue from player k to player k + 1.
Once we have described the concepts mentioned above, it will be possible to tackle the out-
standing issue of showing that Equation (13) does in fact hold for all k > 1. As mentioned, this
will be covered in detail in Section 5. In Section 6 we will compare the various sharing arrangments
between players k−1 and k to see if there could be value gained in changing sharing arrangements.
It will turn out that player k − 1 sharing its demand can lead to the variance of player k’s FIS
being intermediate to the variance of player k’s FIS when player k − 1 shares nothing or its full
information shocks. This would imply that player k’s MSFE will also be intermediate when player
k forecasts one step ahead. We will illustrate this with several examples. In Section 7, we will
summarize the contributions of this paper.
3 Player k − 1’s Order to Player k
As mentioned previously, the inductive hypothesis in Theorem 3 is that player k − 1 > 0 observes
QUARMA demand {Dk−1,t} with respect to its full information shocks.
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θk−1(B)k−1,t
We will call this player k − 1’s “demand equation”. Here we will discuss how player k − 1 goes
about creating its optimal order to player k. Since player k − 1 has already recovered its FIS, it
can forecast its lead-time demand using its demand equation. As in GHS, we call this forecast
and its MSFE mk−1,t and vk−1,t. Using a myopic-order-up-to-policy, player k − 1 determines its
order-up-to-level, Sk−1,t = mk−1,t + ck−1
√
vk−1,t. Then player k − 1 constructs its order to player
k,
Dk,t = Dk−1,t + Sk−1,t − Sk−1,t−1 = Dk−1,t +mk−1,t −mk−1,t−1
13
where the last equality holds because each player’s MSFE is time invariant (ie. vk−1,t = vk−1).
Note that both player k − 1’s order as well as player k’s demand is Dk,t. While it is indeed the
case that numerically player k − 1’s order is player k’s demand, it is important to study Dk,t with
respect to the information that is available to player k − 1 and player k separately.
Recall that mk−1,t and mk−1,t−1 are player k−1’s best linear forecasts, at time t and t−1, of its
lead-time demand and therefore will be a linear combination of present and past values of {k−1,t}
(see Lemma 1 of GHS). Player k− 1’s demand, Dk−1,t, can also be written as a linear combination
of present and past values of {k−1,t} since these are player k − 1’s FIS. Therefore it stands to
reason that Dk,t can be expressed as a linear combination of present and past values of {k−1,t}.
As we will see by Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 below, {Dk,t} will be QUARMA with respect to
{Ck−1,t} where C is some constant when Jk−1 <∞. The case of constant demand (Jk−1 =∞) is
trivial.
The following proposition gives a useful characterization of the QUARMA model.
Proposition 1. We can represent a series {Dt} in terms of a shock series {t} as
φ(B)Dt = c+ λ(B)t (15)
where λ(z) is some polynomial in z ∈ C such that we can write λ(z) = λ0+λ1z+λ2z2+...+λq+Jzq+J
with λq+J 6= 0 and J = inf{j ≥ 0|λj 6= 0} 6= ∞ if and only if Dt is QUARMA with respect to
{λJt}:
φ(B)Dt = c+B
Jθ(B)λJt
where θ(z) = z−Jλ(z)/λJ has a leading coefficient of 1 and no roots at zero.
Proof. First assume that representation (15) holds and write the polynomial λ(z) as the product
of two polynomials and a constant term. The first polynomial will have roots only at 0 (if there
are any roots at 0), and the other will have no roots at 0 and a leading coefficient of 1. To do this,
we note that J represents the multiplicity of the 0-root of λ(z) and that λJ is the first non-zero
coefficient of λ(z). Let θ(z) = z−Jλ−1J λ(z). Therefore (15) can be rewritten as
φ(B)Dt = c+B
Jθ(B)λJt, (16)
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Note the first polynomial is zJ and the second is θ(z) where either zJ has all its roots at 0 or
zJ ≡ 1, while θ(z) has no roots at 0 and a leading coefficient of 1.
The necessity of (15) follows from the the definition of θ(z). By simple arithmetic we can express
λ(z) = zJθ(z)λJ to get λ(z) and equation (15) holds.
At present we are interested in representing player k − 1’s order {Dk,t} in terms of player
k − 1’s FIS {k−1,t}. It follows from Proposition 1 that if we can find a polynomial λk(z) =
λ0 + λ1z + λ2z
2 + ...+ λq˜k+J˜kz
q˜k+J˜k with λq˜k+J˜k 6= 0 and J˜k = inf{j ≥ 0|λj 6= 0} 6=∞ such that
φ(B)Dk,t = d+ λk(B)k−1,t (17)
then {Dk,t} will be QUARMA with respect to {λk,J˜kk−1,t}. The parameters J˜k and q˜k are con-
ceptually different from the Jk and qk appearing in player k’s demand equation since here we are
expressing {Dk,t} in terms of {k−1,t}. The following theorem shows how to find λk(z) from the
polynomials appearing in player k − 1’s demand equation. The formula below is the backbone for
many of the concepts discussed in this paper. It is crucial in finding an example of demand sharing
being intermediate in value to no sharing and shock sharing, which we will see once Example 2
is completed in Section 6. Furthermore, it can be also used to study the asymptotic behavior of
supply chains (including the bullwhip effect), which we leave to future research.
Theorem 1. For k ≥ 2, assume that player k − 1 observes demand series {Dk−1,t} that is
QUARMA(p, qk−1, Jk−1) with respect to shocks {k−1,t}
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θk−1(B)k−1,t (18)
Then, player k − 1’s order to player k, {Dk,t}, will be
φ(B)Dk,t = d+ λk(B)k−1,t (19)
where
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φ(B)Dk,t = d+
{[
BJk−1 + 1{Jk−1>0}[B
max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1)) −BJk−1 ]
+ 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}[B
Jk−1−(`k−1+1) − 1]
]
θk−1(B)
+ 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}φ(B)
[ `k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,L −BJk−1−(`k−1+1)
`k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
]}
k−1,t
where ψk−1,L is the Lth MA(∞) coefficient of Dk−1,t with respect to {k−1,n}t−Jk−1−∞ .
A proof can be found in the Appendix. The constant term d in (19) is the same as the one
appearing in (18). It can turn out that the sums in the above theorem have an upper limit that
is smaller than its lower limit. If this is the case, the sum is 0 by convention. It is important
that λk(z) not have any negative powers of z. Indeed, this can be checked to be the case. The
expression for λk(z) is universal when player k−1 observes QUARMA demand and places its order
according to the order-up-to policy. Combining this result with Proposition 1 we get that {Dk,t}
is QUARMA with respect to {λk,J˜kk−1,t}.
We will write the QUARMA representation of {Dk,t} with respect to {λk,J˜kk−1,t} as
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜k(B)λk,J˜kk−1,t (20)
where we use the “tilde” in θ˜k(z) and J˜k to differentiate that we are expressing {Dk,t} in terms of
{k−1,t} rather than {k,t}. We refer to (20) as player k − 1’s order equation.
The expression for λk(z) in Theorem 1 simplifies greatly when Jk−1 ≥ `k−1 +1 as demonstrated
by the corollary below.
Corollary 1. Consider the assumptions of Theorem 1 with Jk−1 ≥ `k−1 + 1.
Then, player k − 1’s order to player k, {Dk,t}, will be
φ(B)Dk,t = d+ λk(B)k−1,t (21)
where
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λk(z) = z
Jk−1−(`k−1+1)θk−1(z)
Proof. If Jk−1 ≥ `k−1 + 1, then the expression in the conclusion of Theorem 1 simplifies to
λk(z) = z
Jk−1θk−1(z) + zJk−1−(`k−1+1)θk−1(z)− zJk−1θk−1(z)
which is simply
λk(z) = z
Jk−1−(`k−1+1)θk−1(z)
Corollary 1 shows an interesting relationship between player k−1’s demand equation and player
k − 1’s order equation. Specifically, when Jk−1 ≥ `k−1 + 1, we have that J˜k = Jk−1 − (`k−1 + 1)
and θ˜k(z) = θk−1(z).
Example 2. Part II
Recall that it was previously determined that the supplier observes demand equation:
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D2,t = d+ (1− 32
3
B +
20
3
B2)2,t (22)
Using Theorem 1 with J2 = 0 and `2 = 1 we have that
λ3(z) = −1
6
+
13
6
z − 5z2
By Proposition 1 this means that the supplier’s order equation is given by:
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 13B + 30B2)−1
6
2,t (23)
where θ˜3(z) = 1− 13z + 30z2.
4 The QUARMA representation of {Dk,t} with respect to {k,t}
In order to establish the QUARMA representation of player k’s demand, i.e., {Dk,t} with respect
to {k,t}, we must first establish player k’s FIS {k,t}. As we will see, these will depend on the
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location of roots of θ˜k in (20) and the sharing arrangement between player k − 1 and k. Consider
player k − 1’s demand and order equations given in (14) and (20):
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θk−1(B)k−1,t
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜k(B)λk,J˜kk−1,t
Recall that player k’s FIS must satisfy two properties: {Dk,t} is QUARMA with respect to
{k,t} andMkt =Mkt . Therefore player k’s FIS depend on player k’s information set. Furthermore
since the QUARMA representation of {Dk,t} with respect to {k,t} depends on player k’s FIS, it
inherently depends on player k’s information set as well. Thus understanding player k’s information
set is crucial to the study of propagation.
Note that player k’s information set consists of Dk,t and anything shared by player k − 1.
• If there is no sharing between player k and k − 1, Mkt =MDkt
• If player k − 1 shares its demand then Mkt =MDk,Dk−1t
• If player k − 1 shares its shocks then Mkt =MDk,k−1t
This section will be divided into four subsections as we establish some notation and explore
player k’s FIS under the three possible sharing scenarios. The propositions found in Sections 4.2
and 4.4 are restatements of results found in GHS (2012), where the case of no sharing and shock
sharing has previously been studied. They are presented here to keep this paper self-contained and
because they yield insight into how to find and compare FIS under different sharing arrangements.
Section 4.3 focuses on demand sharing and contains several key results of our paper.
4.1 Notation
Before we can show the form of player k’s FIS under various sharing arrangments we must develop
some notation. A lot of the theory from this point on will involve working with the roots of the
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polynomials θk−1(z) and θ˜k(z). Furthermore, we will need to consider the multiplicity of the roots
in the polynomials. To do this we introduce the following definition:
Definition 2. For any z ∈ C and polynomial P , if z is a root of P we define m(z, P ) as the
multiplicity of z in P . If z is not a root of polynomial P we define m(z, P ) = 0.
It will soon be useful to factorize θ˜k(z) into factors having all roots on the the unit circle and
all roots not on the unit circle, for this we utilize the following notation:
Consider player k − 1’s demand and order equations. Suppose the polynomial θ˜k(z) has rk
distinct roots z1, . . . , zrk with respective multiplicities m(z1, θ˜k), . . . ,m(zrk , θ˜k). Note that rk ≤ q˜k.
Then θ˜k(z) has the factorization:
θ˜k(z) =
rk∏
j=1
(1− z
zj
)m(zj ,θ˜k)
Define the following:
θ˜INk :=
∏
{j:|zj |<1}
(1− z
zj
)m(zj ,θ˜k) (24)
θ˜OUTk :=
∏
{j:|zj |>1}
(1− z
zj
)m(zj ,θ˜k) (25)
θ˜ONk :=
∏
{j:|zj |=1}
(1− z
zj
)m(zj ,θ˜k) (26)
θ˜OFFk :=
∏
{j:|zj |6=1}
(1− z
zj
)m(zj ,θ˜k) (27)
If θ˜k has no roots inside the unit circle, then θ˜
IN
k ≡ 1. The same convention holds for the others.
It should be clear that θ˜k = θ˜
IN
k · θ˜OUTk · θ˜ONk by construction.
We will also be interested in identifying any common roots between θ˜k(z) and θk−1(z) inside
the unit circle. To do this we define the following:
θ˜I−Ck :=
∏
{j:|zj |<1}
(1− z
zj
)min(m(zj ,θ˜k),m(zj ,θk−1)) (28)
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The roots of θ˜I−Ck will all be inside the unit circle. Furthermore, since the term m(zj , θk−1) may be
0, θ˜I−Ck will only consist of those roots that are common to both θ˜k and θk−1. Also, the multiplicity
of each root is the minimum of the multiplicities of the root in θ˜k and θk−1. If θk−1(z) and θ˜k(z)
have no common roots inside the unit circle, then θ˜I−Ck ≡ 1.
Finally, define
θ˜I−NCk :=
∏
{j:|zj |<1}
(1− z
zj
)m(zj ,θ˜k)−min(m(zj ,θ˜k),m(zj ,θk−1)) (29)
The roots of θ˜I−NCk will all be inside the unit circle. Furthermore a root of θ˜k is a root of θ˜
I−NC
k if
m(zj , θ˜k) > m(zj , θk−1) and the multiplicity of each root in θ˜I−NCk ism(zj , θ˜k)−min(m(zj , θ˜k),m(zj , θk−1)).
If m(zj , θ˜k) ≤ m(zj , θk−1) for all j, then θ˜I−NCk ≡ 1. Note that θ˜INk = θ˜I−Ck · θ˜I−NCk by construction.
4.2 FIS Under No Sharing
If there is no sharing between player k and player k − 1, player k’s information set is
Mkt =MDkt .
Therefore player k’s FIS {k,t} must satisfy Mkt =MDkt .
Proposition 2. If zJ˜k θ˜k(z) has no roots inside the unit circle then
• {λk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s full information shocks.
• Jk = 0 and θk(z) = θ˜k(z)
Since λk,J˜kk−1,t are player k’s full information shocks, we say k,t = λk,J˜kk−1,t with
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
Jkθk(B)k,t
where Jk = 0 and θk(z) = θ˜k(z).
To state player k’s FIS when there is no sharing and θk(z) has roots inside the unit circle, some
additional notation is required:
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Definition 3. Suppose a polynomial P (z) factorizes as
P (z) =
h∏
s=1
(1− z
as
)
q∏
s=h+1
(1− z
as
)
such that |as|< 1 for 1 ≤ s ≤ h and |as|≥ 1 for h+ 1 ≤ s ≤ q.
Define P †(z) as the polynomial
P †(z) =
h∏
s=1
(1− a¯sz)
q∏
s=h+1
(1− z
as
) (30)
where a¯s is the complex conjugate of as
Proposition 3. Suppose that θ˜k(z) in player k− 1’s order equation has h > 0 roots inside the unit
circle. Then
• { θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s full information shocks.
• Jk = 0 and θk(z) = θ˜†k(z)
The polynomial θ˜k(z) can be factorized as
θ˜k(z) =
h∏
s=1
(1− z
zs
)
q˜k∏
s=h+1
(1− z
zs
)
where the roots z1, ..., zq˜k of θ˜k(z) are such that |zs|< 1 for 1 ≤ s ≤ h and |zs|≥ 1 for h+1 ≤ s ≤ q˜k
and
θ˜†k(z) =
h∏
s=1
(1− z¯sz)
q˜k∏
s=h+1
(1− z
zs
)
When { θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s full information shocks, we say that
k,t =
θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t
which can be rewritten as
θ˜†k(B)
θ˜k(B)
k,t = B
J˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t
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Even if J˜k = 0, there is no way to recover k−1,t from present and past values of {k,t} since
any Laurent series representation of
1
θ˜k(B)
will involve negative powers in B, as explained by
the comments immediately following Example 1 Part II. Thus {k−1,t} cannot be player k’s full
information shocks.
The only scenario not yet covered is that none of the roots of θ˜k(z) are inside the unit circle,
but J˜k > 0. The following proposition gives the FIS in this case:
Proposition 4. Suppose that θ˜k(z) has no roots inside the unit circle and J˜k > 0. Then
• {BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s FIS
• Jk = 0 and θk(z) = θ˜k(z)
Proof. Let
γk−1,t = BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t (31)
Substituting this into (20) we have
φ(B)Dk,t = d+ θ˜k(B)γk−1,t
Since θ˜k(z) has no roots inside the unit circle Proposition 2 states that γk−1,t are player k’s full
information shocks. We say that {k,t} = {BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t}. Furthermore θk(z) = θ˜k(z) and Jk =
0.
Thus we have found player k’s FIS and how to express {Dk,t} in terms of {k,t} when there is
no sharing. We now consider Example 2 for the case that the supplier shares nothing with player
3.
Example 2. Part III
Recall that we previously determined that the supplier’s order equation is given by:
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 13B + 30B2)−1
6
2,t
where θ˜3(z) = 1 − 13z + 30z2 has roots .1 and 1/3. Since θ˜3(z) has a root inside the unit circle
and J˜3 = 0, if the retailer shares nothing, we can use Proposition 3 to determine that player 3’s
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full information shocks are
3,t =
1− 13z + 30z2
1− 13/30z + 1/30z2
−1
6
2,t
The polynomial θ˜†3(z) = 1−13/30z+1/30z2 is determined by (30). Furthermore player 3’s demand
equation is given by
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 13
30
B +
1
30
B2)3,t
Also, from [Brockwell and Davis, 1991], pp. 125-127, the variance of the shocks {3,t} in this case
(no sharing) is given by
σ23,NS =
1
( 110)
2
· 1
(13)
2
· (1
6
)2 · σ22 = 900
1
36
σ22 (32)
4.3 FIS Under Demand Sharing
If player k − 1 shares its demand with player k, player k’s information set is
Mkt =MDk,Dk−1t
Therefore player k’s FIS {k,t} must satisfy Mkt =MDk,Dk−1 . Before we can state player k’s full
information shocks under demand sharing we need to develop the following crucial Lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose we can represent two sequences {X1,t} and {X2,t} in terms of a zero-mean
stationary process {ηt} as
φ(B)X1,t = d+B
J1Θ1(B)ηt (33)
φ(B)X2,t = d+B
J2Θ2(B)ληt (34)
where φ(z) has no roots inside the unit circle, Θ1(z) and Θ2(z) have a leading coefficient of 1 and
no roots at zero, and λ is a non-zero constant.
There exist functions ϑ(z) and ω(z) with one sided Laurent series representations converging in
a disk D that contains the unit circle such that ϑ(B)φ(B)X1,t+ω(B)φ(B)X2,t = ϑ(1)d+ω(1)d+ηt
if and only if the polynomials zJ1Θ1(z) and z
J2Θ2(z) have no common common roots inside or on
the unit circle.
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Lemma 1 states that we can write ηt as a linear combination of present and past values of
X1,t and X2,t if and only if z
J1Θ1(z) and z
J2Θ2(z) have no common common roots inside or on
the unit circle. This concept will play a major role when searching for player k’s FIS when there
is knowledge of both {Dk,t} and {Dk−1,t}. The importance of this lemma will be apparent when
proving the following theorem, which establishes player k’s FIS under demand sharing.
Theorem 2. Suppose that player k − 1 shares its demand series {Dk−1,t} with player k
(i) If zJ˜k θ˜k(z) and z
Jk−1θk−1(z) have no common roots inside the unit circle, then
• {λk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s FIS.
• Jk = J˜k and θk(z) = θ˜k(z)
(ii) If zJ˜k θ˜k(z) has at least one root inside the unit circle in common with z
Jk−1θk−1(z), then
• { θ˜
I−C
k (B)
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
Bmin(J˜k,Jk−1)λk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s FIS
• Jk = J˜k −min(J˜k, Jk−1) and θk(z) = θ˜OUTk (z)θ˜ONk (z)θ˜I−NCk (z)θ˜†I−Ck (z)
The polynomial θ˜†I−Ck (z) is defined using (28) and (30). Theorem 2 implies that if player k− 1
shares its demand, player k can recover player k−1’s full information shocks if and only if zJ˜k θ˜k(z)
and zJk−1θk−1(z) have no common roots inside the unit circle. One can see this by considering
k,t =
θ˜I−Ck (B)
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
Bmin(J˜k,Jk−1)k−1,t
which we can rewrite as
k−1,t =
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
θ˜I−Ck (B)
B−min(J˜k,Jk−1)k,t
If zJ˜k θ˜k(z) has at least one root inside the unit circle in common with z
Jk−1θk−1(z) then at least
one of the following must be true:
• min(J˜k, Jk−1) > 0
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• 1
θ˜I−Ck (z)
does not have a one-sided Laurent Series representation for z ∈ D where the disk D
contains the unit circle
This means that it is impossible to write k−1,t as a linear combination of present and past values
of {k,t} and MDk,Dk−1t 6= Mk−1t . We will compare the full information shocks we see here and
those obtained when there is no sharing or full information shock sharing later in Section 6. For
now we continue Example 2 for the case that the supplier shares its demand with player 3.
Example 2. Part IV
Recall that we previously determined that the supplier’s order equation is given by:
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 13B + 30B2)−1
6
2,t
where θ˜3(z) = 1− 13z+ 30z2 has roots 1/10 and 1/3, which are inside the unit circle. From before,
θ2(z) = 1−32/3z+20/3z2 has roots 1/10 and 3/2. Therefore θ˜3(z) has a root inside the unit circle
in common with θ2(z). Here we assume that the supplier shares its FIS with player 3. By Theorem
2(ii) player 3’s full information shocks are
3,t =
1− 10z
1− 1/10z (−1/6)2,t
The polynomial θ˜I−C3 (z) = 1 − 10z is found from (28) and θ˜†I−C3 (z) = 1 − 1/10z is found using
(30). Furthermore by Theorem 2(ii) we also have that J3 = 0 and θ3(z) = 1 · θ˜I−NC3 (z) · θ˜†I−C3 =
(1− 3z)(1− 1/10z). Therefore player 3’s demand equation is given by
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 31
10
z +
3
10
z2)3,t
Also, following [Brockwell and Davis, 1991], pp. 125-127, we have that the variance of the shocks
{3,t} under demand sharing is
σ23,DS =
1
( 110)
2
(1/6)2σ22 = 100
1
36
σ22 (35)
4.4 FIS Under Full Information Shock Sharing
We close this section by describing player k’s full information shocks when player k − 1 shares
its shocks. In this case player k’s information set is Mkt = MDk,k−1t . Recall that MDk,k−1t =
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sp{1, Dk,t, k−1,t, Dk,t−1, k−1,t−1, . . .}. If we consider player k − 1’s order equation
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜k(B)λk,J˜kk−1,t
and note that φ(z) has no roots inside the unit circle, we can use the same reasoning as in the
proofs of the previous propositions to conclude that Dk,t can be written as the linear combination
of present and past {k−1,t}. This means that the space sp{1, Dk,t, k−1,t, Dk,t−1, k−1,t−1, . . .} is
the same as the space sp{1, k−1,t, k−1,t−1, . . .}. Therefore Mkt =MDk,k−1t =Mk−1t .
Consider γk−1 = λk,J˜kk−1,t. It is readily seen thatM
γk−1
t =Mk−1t and thereforeMkt =Mγk−1t .
Since the order equation above shows that we can represent {Dk,t} as QUARMA with repsect to
{γk−1,t} we conclude that {λk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s FIS. Furthemore Jk = J˜k and θk(z) = θ˜k(z).
The following proposition restates this result.
Proposition 5. If player k − 1 shares its shocks,
• {λk,J˜kk−1,t} are player k’s FIS
• Jk = J˜k and θk(z) = θ˜k(z)
Example 2. Part V
Recall that we previously determined that the supplier’s order equation is given by:
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 13B + 30B2)−1
6
2,t
where θ˜3(z) = 1−13z+30z2 has roots 1/10 and 1/3, which are inside the unit circle. If the supplier
shares its shocks, we can use Proposition 5 to conclude that player 3’s full information shocks are
3,t = (−1/6)2,t
and that player 3’s demand equation is
(1 +
1
3
B +
1
2
B2)D3,t = d+ (1− 13B + 30B2)3,t
The variance of 3,t in this case is given by
σ23,SS =
1
36
σ22 (36)
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We have now recovered player k’s full information shocks and described player k’s demand
equation for every conceivable scenario when player k−1’s demand equation is given by (14). Having
described player k’s demand equation it is possible to continue the propagation forward in the same
way to player k+ 1. The following section summarizes the results in the last three subsections and
uses them to prove that demand does indeed propagate as QUARMA-in QUARMA-out.
5 QUARMA-in-QUARMA-out
In the previous section we found player k’s FIS under no sharing, demand sharing, and full infor-
mation shock sharing when player k − 1’s demand follows demand equation (14). In this section
we will use those results to show that indeed player k − 1’s demand can be modeled as such. We
summarize player k’s FIS from the previous section in the following table:
No Sharing Demand Sharing Full Information
Shock Sharing
Scenario 1 {λk,J˜kk−1,t} {λk,J˜kk−1,t} {λk,J˜kk−1,t}
Scenario 2 { θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t} {λk,J˜kk−1,t} {λk,J˜kk−1,t}
Scenario 3 { θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t} {
θ˜I−Ck (B)
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
Bmin(J˜k,Jk−1)λk,J˜kk−1,t} {λk,J˜kk−1,t}
Table 1: FIS under various conditions and sharing arrangements.
The scenarios described in Table 1 are as follows:
• Scenario 1:= zJk−1θk−1(z) has no roots inside the unit circle
• Scenario 2:= zJ˜k θ˜k(z) has no roots in common with zJk−1θk−1(z) inside the unit circle
• Scenario 3:= zJ˜k θ˜k(z) has a root in common with zJk−1θk−1(z) inside the unit circle
Note that there are three unique forms for the full information shocks in the above table. We
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will refer to this table when proving the central theorem of this section, stated here.
Theorem 3. Suppose the retailer observes causal and invertible ARMA demand
φ(B)D1,t = d+ θ1(B)1,t
and that any player can share nothing, its demand, or its full information shocks with an adjacent
upstream player. Then for any k ≥ 1 we can express player k’s demand as QUARMA with respect
to player k’s full information shocks:
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
Jkθk(B)k,t (37)
where θk(z) has a leading coefficient 1 and no roots at zero.
The only assumption of the above theorem is that the retailer observes causal and invertible
ARMA demand. As we have done throughout this paper, we assume that players can share nothing,
demand, or full information shocks with adjacent upstream players. The conclusion of the theorem
states that demand will propagate as QUARMA throughout the supply chain.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof follows by induction. It is true for k = 1 by assumption since we
can take J1 = 0. Assume that (37) holds for k ≥ 1. We need to show that we can find Jk+1 and
θk+1(z) such that we can express player k + 1’s demand as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
Jk+1θk+1(B)k+1,t
As given by Equation (20) in Section 3, with k+1 and k replacing k and k−1, we can write Dk+1,t
as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
J˜k+1 θ˜k+1(B)λk+1,J˜k+1k,t (38)
In accordance with Table 1, player k + 1’s full information shocks are one of the following:
(i) k+1,t = λk+1,J˜k+1k,t
(ii) k+1,t =
θ˜k+1(B)
θ˜†k+1(B)
BJ˜k+1λk+1,J˜k+1k,t
(iii) k+1,t =
θ˜I−Ck+1 (B)
θ˜†I−Ck+1 (B)
Bmin(J˜k+1,Jk)λk+1,J˜k+1k,t
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For (i), we would write (38) as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
J˜k+1 θ˜k+1(B)λk+1,J˜k+1k+1,t
Here we can take Jk+1 = J˜k+1 and θk+1(z) = θ˜k+1(z) to get the required equation
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
Jk+1θk+1(B)k+1,t
For (ii), we would write (38) as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
J˜k+1 θ˜k+1(B)
θ˜†k+1(B)
θ˜k+1(B)
B−J˜k+1k+1,t
which simplifies as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+ θ˜
†
k+1(B)k+1,t
We would take Jk+1 = 0 and θk+1(z) = θ˜
†
k+1(z) to get the required equation.
Finally, for (iii), we would write (38) as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
J˜k+1 θ˜k+1(B)
θ˜†I−Ck+1 (B)
θ˜I−Ck+1 (B)
B−min(J˜k+1,Jk)k+1,t
which simplifies as
φ(B)Dk+1,t = d+B
J˜k+1−min(J˜k+1,Jk)θ˜OUTk+1 (B)θ˜
I−NC
k+1 (B)θ˜
†I−C
k+1 (B)k+1,t (39)
Here we can take Jk+1 = J˜k+1 −min(J˜k+1, Jk) and θk+1(z) = θ˜OUTk+1 (z)θ˜I−NCk+1 (z)θ˜†I−Ck+1 (z)
Thus we have found a suitable Jk+1 and θk+1 in every case and induction is proved.
6 Comparison of Various Sharing Arrangements
We present here a discussion of the value of demand sharing within a supply chain in contrast to
full information shock sharing and no sharing. We do this by studying the best linear forecast of
lead-time demand for the three sharing arrangements.
Given player k’s demand equation and Lemma 1 of GHS, the best linear forecast of player k′s
leadtime demand is given by mk,t =
∑∞
i=`k+1
ωk,ik,t+`k+1−i + (`k + 1)µd =
∑∞
i=0 ωk,i+`k+1k,t−i +
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(`k + 1)µd with an associated Mean Squared Forecast Error MSFEk = σ
2
k
`k∑
i=0
ω2k,i, where σ
2
k
=
V ar(k,t) and ωk,i are given by
ωk,i =

0 i < 0
ψk,i i = 0
ωk,i−1 + ψk,i 0 < i < `k + 1
ωk,i−1 + ψk,i − ψk,i−`k−1 i ≥ `k + 1
(40)
where ψk,j is the j
th coefficient in the MA(∞) representation of player k’s demand with respect to
its FIS. From this it is clear that player k’s MSFEk is related to the variance of its full information
shocks, σ2k . The following proposition states the variance of player k’s full information shocks
under the three arrangements of no sharing (σ2k,NS), demand sharing (σ
2
k,DS
) and shock sharing
(σ2k,SS).
Proposition 6. Below are the variances of player k’s full information shocks when player k − 1’s
shares its shocks, its demand, or nothing with player k.
• (i) σ2k,SS = λ2k,J˜kσ
2
k−1
• (ii) σ2k,DS =
∏
j:|zj |<1
|zj |−2·min(m(zj ,θ˜k),m(zj ,θk−1))λ2k,J˜kσ
2
k−1
• (iii) σ2k,NS =
∏
j:|zj |<1
|zj |−2·m(zj ,θ˜k)λ2k,J˜kσ
2
k−1
This Proposition follows immediately from the form of player k’s FIS under the three shar-
ing arrangements and [Brockwell and Davis, 1991], pp. 125-127. The expressions for σ2k,DS and
σ2k,NS are not necessarily in simplest form. For example if min(m(zj , θ˜k),m(zj , θk−1)) = 0 for all
roots zj of θ˜k with |zj |< 1 then (ii) would become σ2k,DS = λ2k,J˜kσ
2
k−1 .
The following theorem illustrates the relationship of the variances given in Proposition 6. Note
that we are still considering all the assumptions in Section 2.2.
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Theorem 4. Suppose the retailer observes causal and invertible ARMA demand. For any k > 1,
(i) Suppose θ˜k(z) has at least one root in common with θk−1(z) inside the unit circle. Suppose
further that there is a root zj of θ˜k(z) such that |zj |< 1 and m(zj , θ˜k) > m(zj , θk−1). Then σ2k,SS <
σ2k,DS < σ
2
k,NS
.
(ii) Suppose θ˜k(z) has at least one root in common with θk−1(z) inside the unit circle. Suppose
further that any root zj of θ˜k(z) where |zj |< 1 is such that m(zj , θ˜k) ≤ m(zj , θk−1). Then σ2k,SS <
σ2k,DS = σ
2
k,NS
.
(iii) Suppose θ˜k(z) has no roots in common with θk−1(z) inside the unit circle.
(a) If θ˜k(z) has a root inside the unit circle, then σ
2
k,SS
= σ2k,DS < σ
2
k,NS
(b) If θ˜k(z) has no roots inside the unit circle, then σ
2
k,SS
= σ2k,DS = σ
2
k,NS
Cases (i) and (ii) exhaust the event that θ˜k(z) and θk−1(z) have at least one common root
inside the unit circle. Case (iii) considers what happens when θ˜k(z) and θk−1(z) have no common
roots inside the unit circle. It should be further noted that any roots of θ˜k(z) outside or on the
unit circle have no impact on the variance of the full information shocks.
Example 2. Part VI
Recall the variance of player 3’s full information shocks under the three different sharing ar-
rangements given by (32) (35) and (36):
σ23,NS = 900
1
36
σ22
σ23,DS = 100
1
36
σ22
σ23,SS =
1
36
σ22
We see that indeed
σ23,SS < σ
2
3,DS < σ
2
3,NS . (41)
Furthermore the differences are stark. The polynomial θ˜3(z) has a root, 1/10, in common with
θ2(z) inside the unit circle. Furthermore, θ˜3(z) has a root, 1/3, inside the unit circle, such that
1 = m(1/3, θ˜3) > m(1/3, θ2) = 0. Therefore the conditions of (i) hold and thus (41) is to be
expected.
Theorem 4 also leads to the following useful Corollaries:
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Corollary 2. For any player k, the full information shocks {k} will be such that σ2k,SS ≤ σ2k,DS ≤
σ2k,NS.
The proof follows immediately from Theorem 4.
Corollary 3. For any k > 1 where `k = 0 and J˜k = 0, θ˜k(z) has at least one root in common
with θk−1(z) inside the unit circle and there is a root zj of θ˜k(z) such that |zj |< 1 and m(zj , θ˜k) >
m(zj , θk−1) if and only if
MSFEk,SS < MSFEk,DS < MSFEk,NS
This corollary only applies when player k has to forecast one step ahead. In this case MSFEk =
σ2k and the corollary follows immediately from Theorem 4.
Next we consider Example 2 and explore player 3’s MSFE for the three sharing arrangements
given various lead-times.
Example 2. Part VII
Recall that player 3’s MSFE is given by MSFE3 = σ
2
3
`3∑
i=0
ω23,i where ω3,i’s are given by (40).
From Example 2 we have the variance of player 3’s full information shocks under the three different
sharing arrangements given by (32), (35), and (36):
σ23,NS = 900
1
36
σ22
σ23,DS = 100
1
36
σ22
σ23,SS =
1
36
σ22
We can use (40) and player 3’s demand equations under the three sharing scenarios to find ω3,i
for i = 1, ..., `k for any lead-time `k. We can hence compute the ratios of the MSFEs that arise
given the different sharing arrangements to the MSFE that arises when nothing is shared, which is
displayed in Figure 1 below.
We see that the MSFE that arises under demand sharing is strictly between the other two. We
continue with an example of intermediate value to demand for k > 1 in which J˜k > Jk−1 > 0
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Figure 1: The ratios of player 3’s MSFE under demand sharing and shock sharing to no sharing
for the model given in Example 2
Example 3. Suppose the retailer has lead time `1 = 0, shares its full information shocks with the
supplier and observes the following ARMA(4,4) model of its demand:
(1 + .5B − .2B2 − .4B3 + .4B4)D1,t = d+ (1− .5B + .3B2 − .7B3 + .1B4)1,t (42)
Using Theorem 1 we can compute
λ2(z) = (1− .5z + .3z2 − .7z3 + .1z4) + (z−1 − 1)((1− .5z + .3z2 − .7z3 + .1z4)
− (1 + .5z − .2z2 − .4z3 + .4z4))
= (1− .5z + .3z2 − .7z3 + .1z4) + (z−1 − 1)(−z + .5z2 − .3z3 − .3z4)
= 1− .5z + .3z2 − .7z3 + .1z4 +−1 + .5z − .3z2 − .3z3 + z − .5z2 + .3z3 + .3z4
= z − .5z2 − .7z3 + .4z4
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Thus we have λ2(z) = z(1− .5z− .7z2 + .4z3). From Proposition 1 we have that θ˜2(z) = (1− .5z−
.7z2 + .4z3) and J˜2 = 1. Furthermore since the retailer shared its shocks, Proposition 5 tells us that
θ2(z) = θ˜2(z) and J2 = 1 so the supplier observes the following QUARMA(4,1,3) model:
(1 + .5B − .2B2 − .4B3 + .4B4)D2,t = d+B(1− .5B − .7B2 + .4B3)2,t (43)
The roots of θ2(z) are 1.4575 + 0.147i, 1.4575 − 0.147i, and − 1.165, which are all outside the unit
circle. Assuming that the Supplier has a leadtime `2 = 1 and continuing the propagation using
Theorem 1 we get,
λ3(z) = (1 + .5z − .2z2 − .4z3 + .4z4) + z−1(1− .5z − .7z2 + .4z3
− (1 + .5z − .2z2 − .4z3 + .4z4))
= (1 + .5z − .2z2 − .4z3 + .4z4) + z−1(−z − .5z2 + .8z3 − .4z4)
= 1 + .5z − .2z2 − .4z3 + .4z4 − 1− .5z + .8z2 − .4z3
= .6z2 − .8z3 + .4z4
Thus we have that λ3(z) = z
2(.6− .8z + .4z2). Again by Proposition 1 we get θ˜3(z) = 1− 43z + 23z2
and J˜3 = 2. Player 3’s demand model with respect to player 2’s full information shocks would be
(1 + .5B − .2B2 − .4B3 + .4B4)D3,t = d+B2(1− 4
3
B +
2
3
B2)(
3
5
)2,t (44)
Note that θ˜3(z) has roots 1+0.707i and 1−0.707i which are outside the unit circle, but J˜3 > J2.
This will be central to the intermediate value of demand sharing in this case. For the three sharing
arrangements we have player 3’s FIS and demand equation given by
NS:
3,t =
3
5
B22,t
and
(1 + .5B − .2B2 − .4B3 + .4B4)D3,t = d+ (1− 4
3
B +
2
3
B2)3,t
DS:
3,t =
3
5
B2,t
and
(1 + .5B − .2B2 − .4B3 + .4B4)D3,t = d+B(1− 4
3
B +
2
3
B2)3,t
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SS:
3,t =
3
5
2,t
and
(1 + .5B − .2B2 − .4B3 + .4B4)D3,t = d+B2(1− 4
3
B +
2
3
B2)3,t
Note that the variance of player 3’s full information shocks (σ23 = 9/25σ
2
2) is the same for all three
sharing arrangements. Furthermore θ3(z) is also the same. The only difference is in J3. We can
compute ω23,i using (40) for i = 0, ..., `k for any `k ≥ 0. Thereby we obtain the ratio of the MSFEs
resulting from the three different sharing arrangements to the MSFE that arises when nothing is
shared given in Figure 2 below for lead-times 1,..., 11.
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Figure 2: The ratios of player 3’s MSFE under demand sharing and shock sharing to no sharing
for the model given in Example 3
If the supplier shares its demand, player 3 would have a perfect forecast when forecasting 1-step
ahead. If the supplier shares its FIS, player 3 would have a perfect forecast when forecasting 1
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or 2-steps ahead. Furthermore the resulting MSFE when demand is shared is strictly between the
MSFE when nothing is shared and when shocks are shared for the lead-times considered.
At time t, with no knowledge of the supplier’s demand, player 3 has no way to recover 2,t or
2,t−1. However if the supplier shares its demand then player 3 can recover 2,t−1. Furthermore, if
the supplier shares its full information shock series then player 3 would know both 2,t and 2,t−1.
Having completed Examples 2 and 3, we see that demand sharing between player k − 1 and k
can be intermediate in value in the case when J˜k = 0 as well as in the case of strict-QUARMA
(J˜k > 0). A discussion on how to find such examples is provided in the Appendix.
7 Conclusions and Direction for future research
The major contribution of this paper is that we extended the existing literature by assuming that
there may be one of three possible sharing arrangements between adjacent players:
• no information sharing,
• demand sharing, or
• full information shock sharing.
We demonstrated that the value provided by a demand sharing arrangement can be equivalent
to no sharing, equivalent to full information shock sharing, or intermediate to no sharing and full
information shock sharing. We further characterized when each of these three cases will occur under
demand sharing. We also derive a player’s full information set, its full information shocks, as well
as its best linear forecast under demand sharing and show how demand propagates upstream.
We proved that demand propagates according to QUARMA-in-QUARMA-out in the presence
of either no sharing, demand sharing, or full information shock sharing. We further showed that
demand sharing provides intermediate value to player k when (i) the MA polynomials for player
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k-1’s demand and order have at least one common root inside the unit circle, and (ii) the MA
polynomial for player k-1’s order has at least one additional root inside the unit circle.
Finally, we have provided a simpler methodology for the way in which demand propagates in a
supply chain in the presence of no sharing or shock sharing. Based upon this approach, we have a
convenient way of exploring other features of possibly large supply chains which we leave to future
research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ψk−1(B) =
θk−1(B)
φ(B) =
∞∑
j=0
ψk−1,jBj with ψk−1,0 = 1. Such a representation
exists because φ(z) is assumed to have all its roots outside the unit circle. We can then write
Dk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+BJk−1ψk−1(B)k−1,t (45)
Note that dφ(1) is indeed the correct constant term since we know that E[φ(B)Dk−1,t] = φ(1)E[Dk−1,t].
According to the order-up-to policy, Dk,t = Dk−1,t +mk−1,t−mk−1,t−1 where mk−1,t and mk−1,t−1
are the best linear forecasts of leadtime demand at time t and t− 1 respectively.
Because player k−1’s leadtime is `k−1, the player would have to forecastDk−1,t+1, ..., Dk−1,t+`k−1+1.
Using (45) we have, for any nonnegative integer n,
Dk−1,t+n =
d
φ(1)
+BJk−1−nψk−1(B)k−1,t
And consequently, since mk−1,t is the best linear forecast of
∑`k−1+1
i=1 Dk−1,t+i
mk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+
`k−1+1∑
n=1
BJk−1−n
∞∑
j=max(0,n−Jk−1)
Bjψk−1,jk−1,t (46)
If `k−1 + 1 > Jk−1 we can write (46) as
mk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+
{ Jk−1∑
n=1
BJk−1−nψk−1(B)+
`k−1+1∑
n=Jk−1+1
BJk−1−n
[
ψk−1(B)−
n−Jk−1−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
]}
k−1,t
(47)
If `k−1 + 1 ≤ Jk−1 we can write (46) as
mk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+
`k−1+1∑
n=1
BJk−1−nψk−1(B)k−1,t (48)
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Combining (47) and (48), and using the convention that if the upper limit is smaller than the
lower limit of a sum, that sum is 0, we have that
mk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+
{min(Jk−1,`k−1+1)∑
n=1
BJk−1−nψk−1(B)+
`k−1+1∑
n=Jk−1+1
BJk−1−n
[
ψk−1(B)−
n−Jk−1−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
]}
k−1,t
(49)
or equivalently,
mk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+
{ Jk−1−1∑
n=max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1))
Bnψk−1(B)+
`k−1+1−Jk−1∑
n=1
B−n
[
ψk−1(B)−
n−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
]}
k−1,t.
(50)
Using the backshift operator, the order-up-to policy dictates that Dk,t = Dk−1,t+(1−B)mk−1,t.
By (50) and (18) we have that
φ(B)Dk,t = d +
{
BJk−1θk−1(B) + (1−B)
Jk−1−1∑
j=max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1))
Bjθk−1(B)
+ (1−B)
`k−1+1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−j
[
θk−1(B)− φ(B)
j−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
]}
k−1,t (51)
Note that (1−B)
Jk−1−1∑
j=max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1))
Bjθk−1(B)
=
Jk−1−1∑
j=max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1))
Bjθk−1(B)−
Jk−1∑
j=max(1,Jk−1−(`k−1))
Bjθk−1(B)
= 1{Jk−1>0}[B
max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1)) −BJk−1 ] (52)
Furthermore
(1−B)
`k−1+1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−jθk−1(B) =
`k−1+1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−jθk−1(B)−
`k−1−Jk−1∑
j=0
B−jθk−1(B)
= 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}[B
Jk−1−(`k−1+1) − 1]θk−1(B) (53)
and likewise,
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(1−B)
`k−1+1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−j
j−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
=
`k−1+1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−j
j−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL −
`k−1−Jk−1∑
j=0
B−j
j∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
= BJk−1−(`k−1+1)
`k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL +
`k−1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−j
j−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
−
`k−1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−j
j∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL −B0ψk−1,0B0
= 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}
[
BJk−1−(`k−1+1)
`k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL −
`k−1−Jk−1∑
j=1
B−jψk−1,jBj − ψk−1,0
]
= 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}
[
BJk−1−(`k−1+1)
`k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL −
`k−1−Jk−1∑
j=0
ψk−1,j
]
(54)
Therefore using (52), (53) and (54), (51) becomes
φ(B)Dk,t = d+
{[
BJk−1 + 1{Jk−1>0}[B
max(0,Jk−1−(`k−1+1)) −BJk−1 ]
+ 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}[B
Jk−1−(`k−1+1) − 1]
]
θk−1(B)
+ 1{`k−1≥Jk−1}φ(B)
[ `k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,L −BJk−1−(`k−1+1)
`k−1−Jk−1∑
L=0
ψk−1,LBL
]}
k−1,t
Proof of Proposition 2. Let γk−1,t = λk,J˜kk−1,t
We can rewrite player k − 1’s order equation as
Dk,t =
d
φ(1)
+BJ˜k
θ˜k(B)
φ(B)
γk−1,t
The term dφ(1) is indeed the correct constant here since we know that E[φ(B)Dk−1,t] = φ(1)E[Dk−1,t].
Since φ(B) has no roots inside the unit circle, there exists a one-sided Laurent series expansion
Lφ(z) of
1
φ(z)
for z ∈ D such that disk D contains the unit circle. Inserting this into the previous
expression,
Dk,t =
d
φ(1)
+BJ˜k θ˜k(B)L
φ(B)γk−1,t
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The Laurent series expansion Lφ(z) has the form
Lφ(z) =
∞∑
n=0
Ψnz
nforz ∈ D
This shows that, for any t, we can write Dk,t as a linear combination of present and past γk−1,t ie.
Dk,t ∈ sp{1, γk−1,t, γk−1,t−1, γk−1,t−2, ...} and therefore MDkt ⊂Mγk−1t .
Furthermore, we can also rewrite player k − 1’s order equation as
φ(B)
θ˜OFFk (B)
Dk,t − d
θ˜OFFk (1)
= BJ˜k θ˜ONk (B)γk−1,t
where θ˜OFFk (z) and θ˜
ON
k (z) are defined in 27 and 26. Let {νk−1,t} = {θ˜ON (B)γk−1,t} and rewrite
this as
φ(B)
θ˜OFFk (B)
Dk,t − d
θ˜OFFk (1)
= BJ˜kνk−1,t
Note that zJ˜k θ˜k(z) has no roots inside or on the unit circle, J˜k = 0 and there exists a one-sided
Laurent Series Expansion Lθ˜k(z) of
1
θ˜OFFk (z)
for z ∈ D such that disk D contains the unit circle.
Therefore, for any t, we can write νk−1,t as a linear combination of present and past Dk,t.
Thus Mνk−1t ⊂ MDkt . Finally, by [Brockwell and Davis, 1991] Proposition 4.4.1 Mγk−1t ⊂
Mνk−1t . Therefore Mγk−1t ⊂MDkt .
Thus we have shown that MDkt = Mγk−1t . Since Mkt = MDkt we have that Mγk−1t = Mkt . If
we can show that player k’s demand {Dk,t} can be written as QUARMA with respect to {γk−1,t}
then these will be player k’s FIS. To do this recall that k−1,t = γk−1,t/λk,J˜k . Substituting this into
player k − 1’s order equation we get
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜k(B)γk−1,t
Thus if we take Jk = J˜k = 0 and θk(z) = θ˜k(z) we will get the QUARMA representation of Dk,t
with respect to γk−1,t. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let
γk−1,t =
θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t (55)
We can rewrite k−1,t in terms of γk−1,t as
λk,J˜kk−1,t =
θ˜†k(B)
θ˜k(B)
B−J˜kγk−1,t
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Substituting this into (20) we have
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
θ˜k(B)
B−J˜kγk−1,t
and simplifying
φ(B)Dk,t = d+ θ˜
†
k(B)γk−1,t
The polynomial θ˜†k(B) has no roots inside the unit circle. Therefore by Proposition 2 we have
that γk−1,t are player k’s full information shocks. Thus we say that {k,t} = θ˜k(B)
θ˜†k(B)
BJ˜kλk,J˜kk−1,t.
Furthermore θk(z) = θ˜
†
k(z) and Jk = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. We can rewrite (33) and (34) as
φ(B)
ΘOUT1 (B)
X1,t =
d
ΘOUT1 (1)
+BJ1ΘIN1 (B)Θ
ON
1 (B)ηt (56)
φ(B)
ΘOUT2 (B)
X2,t =
d
ΘOUT2 (1)
+BJ2ΘIN2 (B)Θ
ON
2 (B)ληt (57)
Where ΘIN1 , Θ
IN
2 , Θ
OUT
1 , Θ
OUT
2 , Θ
ON
1 and Θ
ON
2 are polynomials defined in the same way as θ˜
IN
k (z),
θ˜OUTk (z) and θ˜
ON
k are defined in (24), (25) and (26).
Consider the polynomials P1(z) = z
J1ΘIN1 (z)Θ
ON
1 (z) and P2(z) = λz
J2ΘIN2 (z)Θ
ON
2 (z). Sup-
pose P2(z) has r2 distinct non-zero roots b1, ..., br2 .
Define
GCD(P1, P2) := z
min(J1,J2)
r2∏
j=1
(1− z
bj
)min{m(bj ,P1),m(bj ,P2)}
The roots of GCD(P1, P2) are those roots that are common to both P1 and P2. Furthermore
the multiplicity of each root is the minimum of the multiplicities of the root in P1 and P2. By
construction, the coefficient in front of the lowest power of z of GCD(P1, P2) is 1.
By the Euclidean Algorithm for polynomials (cf. [Koblitz, 1998] pg 63) we know that there
exist polynomials Q1(z) and Q2(z) such that
Q1P1 +Q2P2 = GCD(P1, P2) (58)
Suppose ΘON1 (z) has r1,on distinct roots b1, ..., br1,on . Define Θ
ON−C
1 as
ΘON−C1 :=
r1,on∏
j=1
(1− z
bj
)min(m(bj ,Θ
ON
1 ),m(bj ,Θ
ON
2 ))
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Note that if ΘON1 (z) and Θ
ON
2 (z) have no common roots, then Θ
ON−C
1 ≡ 1.
Noting that GCD(zJ1ΘIN1 (z)Θ
ON
1 (z), λz
J2ΘIN2 (z)Θ
ON
2 (z)) = z
min(J1,J2)ΘI−C1 (z)Θ
ON−C
1 (z) the
Euclidean Algorithm tells us how to find polynomials Q1(z) and Q2(z) such that
zJ1Q1(z)Θ
IN
1 (z) + λz
J2Q2(z)Θ
IN
2 (z) = z
min(J1,J2)ΘI−C1 (z)Θ
ON−C
1 (z) (59)
Therefore multiplying (56) and (57) by Q1(B) and Q2(B) and summing we get
1
ΘOUT1 (B)
φ(B)Q1(B)X1,t +
1
ΘOUT2 (B)
φ(B)Q2(B)X2,t = C +B
min(J1,J2)ΘI−C1 (B)Θ
ON−C
1 ηt (60)
where C = Q1(1)d
ΘOUT1 (1)
+ Q2(1)d
ΘOUT2 (1)
is a constant.
IfBJ1ΘIN1 (z)Θ
ON
1 (z) andB
J2ΘIN2 (z)Θ
ON
2 (z) have no common roots then Θ
I−C
1 (z) ≡ 1, ΘON−C1 (z) ≡
1 (and min(J1, J2) = 0) in (60) and therefore we can take ϑ(z) =
Q1(z)
ΘOUT1 (z)
and ω(z) = Q2(z)
ΘOUT2 (z)
to
get
ϑ(B)φ(B)X1,t + ω(z)φ(B)X2,t = C + ηt
Furthermore since ΘOUT1 (z) and Θ
OUT
2 (z) have no roots inside or on the unit circle by construc-
tion, their reciprocals have one-sided Laurent series representations that converge in a disk D that
contains the unit circle. Therefore the constructed ϑ(z) and ω(z) have one-sided Laurent Series
Representations that converge for all z ∈ D. Note that C = ϑ(1)d+ ω(1)d.
Now suppose that there exist functions ϑ(z) and ω(z) with one sided Laurent Series Representa-
tions that converge in D such that ϑ(B)φ(B)X1,t+ω(B)φ(B)X2,t = C+ηt where C = ϑ(1)d+ω(1)d.
From (33) and (34) we can rewrite this as
ϑ(1)d+ ω(1)d+BJ1ϑ(B)Θ1(B)ηt +B
J2ω(B)Θ2(B)ληt = C + ηt
which simplifies to
BJ1ϑ(B)Θ1(B)ηt +B
J2ω(B)Θ2(B)ληt = ηt (61)
Define L(z) := zJ1ϑ(z)Θ1(z) + z
J2ω(z)Θ2(z)λ − 1. Note that (61) implies that for all µ ∈
[−pi, pi], L(e−iµ) ≡ 0. Consider the Laurent series expansion of L(z) for z ∈ D,
L(z) =
∞∑
k=−∞
gkz
k = zJ1ϑ(z)Θ1(z) + z
J2ω(z)Θ2(z)λ− 1 (62)
The Laurent Series (62) must have the same coefficients gk as the Fourier series expansion
L(e−iµ) =
∞∑
k=−∞
gke
−iµk = e−iµJ1ϑ(e−iµ)Θ1(e−iµ) + e−iµJ2ω(e−iµ)Θ2(e−iµ)λ− 1 (63)
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Since L(e−iµ) ≡ 0, gk ≡ 0 for all k in (63) and therefore in (62). This shows that L(z) ≡ 0 for
all z ∈ D.
If Θ1(z) and Θ2(z) had a common root z0 inside or on the unit circle then we would have
L(z0) = −1 in (62) which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2. To show (i) suppose zJ˜k θ˜k(z) and z
Jk−1θk−1(z) have no common roots inside
the unit circle. We would like to show thatMDk,Dk−1t =Mk−1t . Since φ(z) has no roots inside the
unit circle we can rewrite (14) and (20) as:
Dk−1,t =
d
φ(1)
+
∞∑
j=0
Ψk−1,jk−1,t−j−Jk−1
Dk,t =
d
φ(1)
+
∞∑
j=0
Ψ˜k,jλk,J˜kk−1,t−j−J˜k
where {Ψk−1,j} and {Ψ˜k,j} converge exponentially fast to zero. This shows that MDk,Dk−1t ⊂
Mk−1t .
To show that Mk−1t ⊂ MDk,Dk−1t first suppose that θk−1(z) and θ˜k have no common roots on
the unit circle. Since zJ˜k θ˜k(z) and z
Jk−1θk−1(z) have no common roots inside the unit circle, from
Lemma 1, there exist functions ϑ(z) and ω(z) with one-sided Laurent series representations such
that
ϑ(B)Dk−1,t + ω(B)Dk,t = ϑ(1)d+ ω(1)d+ k−1,t
Thus Mk−1t ⊂MDk,Dk−1t .
Now suppose that θk−1(z) and θ˜k(z) have h > 0 distinct common roots on the unit circle and
θ˜k(z) has rk,on distinct roots b1, ..., brk,on on the unit circle. Define θ˜
ON−C
k as
θ˜ON−Ck :=
rk,on∏
j=1
(1− z
bj
)min(m(bj ,θk−1),m(bj ,θ˜k))
Thus we can rewrite player k − 1’s demand and order equations as
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θ∗k−1(B)θ˜
ON−C
k (B)k−1,t (64)
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜∗k(B)θ˜
ON−C
k (B)λk,J˜kk−1,t (65)
where θ∗k−1 =
θk−1
θ˜ON−Ck
and θ˜∗k =
θ˜k
θ˜ON−Ck
. Let νk−1,t = θON−Ck−1 (B)k−1,t. Note that we can rewrite
(64) and (65) as
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θ∗k−1(B)νk−1,t
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φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜∗k(B)λk,J˜kνk−1,t
where the last equality comes from the fact that θON−Ck−1 (z) = θ˜
ON−C
k (z). Noting that θ
∗
k−1(z) and
θ˜∗k(z) have no common roots on or inside the unit circle we can use Lemma 1 to get functions ϑ(z)
and ω(z) with one sided Laurent series representations converging in a disk D that contains the
unit circle such that
ϑ(B)φ(B)Dk−1,t + ω(B)φ(B)Dk,t = ϑ(1)d+ ω(1)d+ νk−1,t
Therefore Mνk−1t ⊂ MDk,Dk−1t . Furthermore by [Brockwell and Davis, 1991] Proposition 4.4.1
Mk−1t ⊂Mνk−1t and thus Mk−1t ⊂MDk,Dk−1t in this case as well.
Finally let γk−1,t = λk,J˜kk−1,t. Noting that M
γk−1
t = Mk−1t = Mkt and plugging γk−1,t into
player k’s order equation we get
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜k(B)γk−1,t
Thus we can write {Dk,t} as QUARMA with respect to {γk−1,t} and therefore these are player k’s
full information shocks. Furthemore Jk = J˜k and θk(z) = θ˜k(z) and the proof of (i) is complete.
To show part (ii) suppose that zJ˜k θ˜k(z) and z
Jk−1θk−1(z) have a common root inside the unit
circle. Let ξk−1,t =
θ˜I−Ck (B)
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
Bmin(J˜k,Jk−1)k−1,t where θ˜I−Ck is defined in (28) and θ˜
†I−C
k is defined
by (30). Since θ˜†I−Ck (B) has all its roots outside the unit circle, ξk−1,t ∈M
k−1
t . We will show that
MDk,Dk−1t =Mξk−1t .
Define θI−C
c
k−1 :=
θk−1
θ˜I−Ck
and θ˜I−C
c
k :=
θ˜k
θ˜I−Ck
. Then we can rewrite player k−1’s demand and order
equations as
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1θI−C
c
k−1 (B)θ˜
I−C
k (B)k−1,t
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k θ˜I−C
c
k (B)θ˜
I−C
k (B)λk,J˜kk−1,t
Replacing k−1,t with
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
θ˜I−Ck (B)
B−min(J˜k,Jk−1)ξk−1,t we get
φ(B)Dk−1,t = d+BJk−1−min(J˜k,Jk−1)θI−C
c
k−1 (B)θ˜
†I−C
k (B)ξk−1,t (66)
φ(B)Dk,t = d+B
J˜k−min(J˜k,Jk−1)θ˜I−C
c
k (B)θ˜
†I−C
k (B)λk,J˜kξk−1,t (67)
The polynomials θI−C
c
k−1 (z) and θ˜
I−Cc
k (z) have no common roots inside the unit circle by defini-
tion. Therefore the polynomials zJk−1−min(J˜k,Jk−1)θI−C
c
k−1 (B)θ˜
†I−C
k (B) and z
J˜k−min(J˜k,Jk−1)θ˜I−C
c
k (z)θ˜
†I−C
k (z)
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have no common roots inside the unit circle. Thus by part (i) we have that λk,J˜kξk−1,t are player
k’s full information shocks. Thus we have the result that k,t = λk,J˜k
θ˜I−Ck (B)
θ˜†I−Ck (B)
Bmin(J˜k,Jk−1)k−1,t.
Furthermore θk(z) = θ˜
I−Cc
k (B)θ˜
†I−C
k (B) and Jk = J˜k −min(J˜k, Jk−1). Noting that θ˜I−C
c
k (B) =
θ˜OUTk (z)θ˜
ON
k θ˜
I−NC
k we get the intended result.
Proof of Theorem 4. Recall Proposition 6 which states that
σ2k,SS = λ
2
k,J˜k
σ2k−1 (68)
σ2k,DS =
∏
j:|zj |<1
|zj |−2·min(m(zj ,θ˜k),m(zj ,θk−1))λ2k,J˜kσ
2
k−1 (69)
σ2k,NS =
∏
j:|zj |<1
|zj |−2·m(zj ,θ˜k)λ2k,J˜kσ
2
k−1 (70)
To prove (i) consider (69). Since θ˜k(z) and θk−1(z) share a root inside the unit circle, there
is a zj in the product such that m(zj , θ˜k) > 0 and m(zj , θk−1) > 0. Since |zj |< 1 we have that
σ2k,SS < σ
2
k,DS
.
Now consider (70). There exists zj with |zj |< 1 such that m(zj , θ˜k) > m(zj , θk−1) by assumption
and therefore σ2k,DS < σ
2
k,NS
. Combining this with the previous result and we have that σ2k,SS <
σ2k,DS < σ
2
k,NS
.
To prove (ii) consider (69) again. Since θ˜k(z) and θk−1(z) share a root inside the unit circle,
there is a zj in the product such that m(zj , θ˜k) > 0 and m(zj , θk−1) > 0. Since |zj |< 1 we have
that σ2k,SS < σ
2
k,DS
.
Furthermore, by assumption, all roots zj of θ˜k where |zj |< 1 are such that m(zj , θ˜k) ≤
m(zj , θk−1). Therefore for all j, min(m(zj , θ˜k),m(zj , θk−1)) = m(zj , θ˜k) and (70) is equivalent
to (69). Therefore σ2k,DS = σ
2
k,NS
and the result is proved.
To prove (iii) consider (69) again. If θ˜k(z) has no roots in common with θk−1(z) inside the unit
circle then min(m(zj , θ˜k),m(zj , θk−1)) = 0 for all j. Thus (69) is equivalent to (68) and we have
that σ2k,SS = σ
2
k,DS
.
For part (a), since θ˜k has a root inside the unit circle, there exists a root zj such that |zj |< 1
and m(zj , θ˜k) > 0. Therefore σ
2
k,NS
given by (70) is such that σ2k,NS > σ
2
k,SS
and we have the
result that σ2k,SS = σ
2
k,DS
< σ2k,NS .
For part (b), assuming that θ˜k(z) has no roots inside the unit circle, we note from (70) that
σ2k,NS = λ
2
k,J˜k
σ2k−1 and therefore by (68) we get that σ
2
k,NS
= σ2k,SS . Therefore σ
2
k,SS
= σ2k,DS =
45
σ2k,NS .
Finding Examples of Intermediate Value of Demand Sharing
There are several examples in this paper that illustrate how intermediate value to demand
sharing can arise. Here we present a discussion on how such examples can be found. The main
focus here is finding some k > 0 such that player k − 1 sharing its demand will be intermediate in
value to the other two possible sharing arrangements and Jk−1 = J˜k = 0 (the non-strict-QUARMA
case) where the retailer observes casual and invertible ARMA demand. In particular we show a
set of conditions for the coefficients of the retailer’s model such that all the requirements hold and
there is intermediate value to player 2 sharing its demand with player 3 where J2 = J˜3 = 0 and
`3 = 0.
Since we need for J2 = J˜3 = 0, it could be shown that player 2 and player 3 must observe
ARMA(2,2) demand with respect to player 2’s full information shocks in this case. According to
Corollary 3, there will be intermediate value to demand sharing if θ2(z) and θ˜3(z) have a root
inside the unit circle in common and θ˜3(z) has a root r inside the unit circle such that |r|< 1
m(r, θ˜3) > m(r, θ2). We can therefore express the roots of θ2(z) as z0 and z2,1 and the roots of
θ˜3(z) as z0 and z˜3,1 where z0 is the common root and z˜3,1 6= z2,1.
The following Remark lists conditions under which the retailer observes causal and invertible
ARMA and there is intermediate value to player 2 sharing its demand with player 3 where J2 =
J˜3 = 0.
Remark 2. Suppose the retailer observes ARMA(2,2) demand such that the following conditions
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hold for θ1(z) and φ(z):
φ1 + φ2 < 1, φ2 − φ1 < 1, − 1 < φ2 < 1 (71)
θ1,1 + θ1,2 < 1, θ1,2 − θ1,1 < 1, − 1 < θ1,2 < 1 (72)
1 + φ1 = 1/z2,1 where z2,1 is a root of θ2(z) (73)
|1 + φ1 − θ2,1| > 1 (74)
|φ2 − φ1| < |φ2| (75)
1
1 + φ1
6= φ2 − φ1
φ1
(76)
Suppose further that the retailer shares the equivalent of its full information shocks with player 2
and that J2 = J˜3 = 0, `1 = 1, `2 = 1 and `3 = 0. Then the retailer’s demand is causal and invertible
with respect to its full information shocks and player 2 sharing its demand will be intermediate to
no sharing or full information shock sharing.
Note that z2,1 and θ2,1 in (73) and (74) are not free parameters. They will depend on choices of
φ(z) and θ1(z). Constraints (71) and (72) are triangle conditions that guarantee that the retailer
observes a causal and invertible ARMA(2,2) model. Constraints (73)-(76) guarantee that we have
intermediate value to demand sharing between player 2 and player 3. The proof of this latter fact
is done by analyzing the relationship of the parameters of the retailers ARMA model on the roots
of θ2(z) and θ˜3(z).
The constraints in Remark 2 form the backbone for finding the Examples of intermediate value
of demand sharing. The space defined by these constraints is certainly non-empty as demonstrated
by the Examples in this paper.
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